Somebody can copy your encrypted traffic today without being able to read it. If they keep it, they may be able to read it later.
That is the whole idea behind "harvest now, decrypt later". Most internet connections agree on their encryption keys with public-key methods such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. A large enough quantum computer could break those methods. Such a computer doesn't exist yet, and nobody knows exactly when one will. But recorded traffic doesn't expire. Whatever is captured now can be opened on the day the machine arrives.
So the real question isn't "when will quantum computers come?" It's "how long does my data need to stay secret?"
A simple test
Michele Mosca of the University of Waterloo put it as three numbers:
- X: how many years your data must stay confidential
- Y: how many years it will take you to move your systems to post-quantum encryption
- Z: how many years until a quantum computer can break today's public-key encryption
If X + Y is larger than Z, you are already late. Data you send today will still matter when it becomes readable.
Take a hospital that keeps patient records private for 25 years and needs 5 years to upgrade its systems. If the first capable quantum computer is 15 years away, records it sends today become readable while they still have 10 years of secrecy left. And until its upgrade is done, every record it sends adds to the pile.
What is at risk now, and what isn't
Not everything is equally exposed, and that helps you decide what comes first.
- Data travelling over networks is the main risk today. Web traffic, APIs, VPN tunnels, file transfers and backups sent off-site can all be recorded in transit and stored.
- Digital signatures are a later problem. A forged signature only becomes possible once the quantum computer exists. It can't be done retroactively to traffic recorded today. Signatures still need to move, but they aren't a "harvest now" target.
- Symmetric encryption and hashing hold up. Algorithms such as AES and SHA-2 remain approved and aren't expected to be replaced in this transition. The weak point is the public-key step that agrees on the keys, not the bulk encryption itself.
What to protect first
Start with data that has a long secrecy life and is sent over a network:
- Health and genetic records. They stay sensitive for a lifetime, and the people they describe can't change them.
- Identity data. National ID numbers, passport scans and biometrics can't be replaced like a password.
- Legal and financial documents. Contracts, merger talks, tax files and anything under a long retention rule.
- Research and intellectual property. Unpublished results, designs, formulas and source code that are worth years of work.
- Government and defence material, which is often classified for decades.
- Long-lived secrets in transit. Master keys, certificates and credentials that are copied between systems over the network.
Data that loses its value in days, such as most chat messages about lunch, can wait.
Where to start this month
You don't need to replace everything at once. A first pass looks like this:
- Make a list of your data and how long each kind must stay secret. This is the X in the test above.
- Find where that data travels. Which websites, APIs, partner links, VPNs and backup jobs carry it?
- Check what those connections use today. Many servers and libraries already support a hybrid post-quantum key exchange, a classical and a post-quantum method used together. OpenSSH, for example, has used a hybrid post-quantum key exchange by default since version 9.0 in 2022. Often the upgrade is a library update and a configuration change.
- Watch for silent fallback. Hybrid protection usually only works when both sides support it. If one side doesn't, the connection drops back to classical encryption without telling anyone. For your most sensitive links, decide whether that fallback is acceptable.
- Ask your suppliers. Cloud, hosting, VPN and software vendors should be able to tell you their post-quantum plans and dates.
The deadlines are already set
Regulators have published their dates:
- United States: NIST's transition report (IR 8547, final in October 2026) deprecates today's quantum-vulnerable public-key methods, such as RSA and elliptic-curve, after 2030 and disallows them after 2035.
- European Union: member states are asked to start the move to post-quantum cryptography by the end of 2026 and to protect high-risk uses no later than the end of 2030.
- United Kingdom: the NCSC asks organisations to finish discovery and planning by 2028, complete their highest-priority migration by 2031, and move everything by 2035.
For data with a 10-year or longer secrecy life, these dates already sit inside the window.
One option for the most sensitive links
Most of the work above happens inside your existing systems. For the few links where silent fallback isn't acceptable, such as a partner portal, a records system or a research data room, another option is a web address that can only be reached over a post-quantum connection.
That's what a .pqc name does. It opens in PQC NOW Browser over a hybrid post-quantum connection, and if that connection can't be made, it doesn't open at all. Your existing site and server stay as they are.
PQC NOW Browser also shows, for any website you visit, whether the connection is post-quantum. It's a quick way to see where the sites and services you rely on stand today.
- Read: What is a .pqc name?
- Get the browser: pqcnow.com/downloads
Questions: info@pqcnow.com
Written with AI help and checked by the PQC NOW team. PQC NOW is a product of ZincirX.
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